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Abstract 
Previous research suggests that government initiated programmes have often failed to match 
the process of regeneration to the local challenges faced.  This paper explores the potential 
for enhancing the efficacy of government support by means of a case study within which a 
government agency attempted to better match the process to the challenge.  The findings 
suggest a need to be more realistic about what can be achieved through regeneration 
assistance.  Long-term regeneration processes need to be locally led, where “big fix” external 
prescriptions do not adequately match the process to the challenge.  New models for 
government support are required which recognise that successful processes are developed 
through sustained “small wins” over long periods. Whilst tensions between external 
governance ideas/concepts and the practical realities of local implementation remain, locally 
specific challenges to implementation cannot be circumvented through external prescription 
tied to funding.    
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Introduction 
Viewed within the context of small towns, which is the focus of this paper, in-depth studies 
exploring the practical realities of regeneration processes have illustrated the lengthy 
timescales involved in making a difference locally (Paradis, 2000; Morris, 2011; Markey et 
al., 2012; Burayidi, 2013).  Indeed, regeneration is a complex/multi-dimensional process. 
Robertson (2001) suggests the need to ‘be patient … revitalization efforts always take many 
years of small steady, incremental steps before noticeable improvements are evident to all’ 
(p20).  Favourable outcomes also require local collaboration, where the practical realities of 
regeneration are such that ‘no single stakeholder has the resources or jurisdiction to tackle the 
multi-dimensional problems’ faced (Markey et al., 2012, p226).  Small towns vary 
significantly in terms of their history, geography, assets upon which they can draw, political 
and policy contexts, and local capacity/entrepreneurial initiative (Powe and Hart, 2008). 
Local flexibility and sensitivity must therefore be implicit within strategic thinking and the 
governance structures developed (Robertson, 2004; 2006).  In summary, small town 
regeneration challenges are considered to be long-term, complex/multi-dimensional, 
involving many actors and having locally specific challenges.   
 
Internationally, many schemes have been developed to try and address these challenges 
within small towns. These have differed both in terms of their focus and the involvement of 
external partners.  Examples of where the process has failed to match the challenge include  
government interventions in Australia and Canada, that have led to top-down prescription 
rather than local specificity, and short-term rather than long-term support (Herbert-Cheshire 
and Higgins, 2004; Cheshire, 2006; Markey et al., 2012).  Likewise in the UK context, which 
is the focus of this paper, government involvement has also often failed to match the process 
of regeneration to the challenge (Jones and Little, 2000; Edwards et al., 2000; Caffyn, 2004; 
Morris, 2012).  Albeit prescriptive in terms of their narrow commercial orientation around a 
four point structure (organisation, promotion, design and economic restructuring) and perhaps 
lacking in funds (Burayidi, 2013), the use of local partnerships and strategy-led approaches 
within the Main Street and other charity-orientated programmes in the US has at least enabled 
longer term consistency of support and local specificity within delivery (Luther and Flora, 
2000; Peiser and Nelson, 1997; Robertson, 2004; Daniels et al., 2007).   
 
In terms of the UK, given the pressures to ‘hit the ground running’ within both urban and 
rural regeneration initiatives (Craig and Taylor, 2002, p139; Lawless, 2011), processes have 
often been given insufficient time for strategy formation (Jones and Little, 2000; Countryside 
Agency, 2004; Osborne et al., 2004; Lawless et al., 2010; Tallon, 2010; Morris, 2011; 2012; 
Henderson, 2012).  Rather than a desire to address the long-term, locally-specific challenges 
faced, such initiatives have tended to be driven by the ‘immediacy of ... political life’ 
(Lawless et al., 2010, page 273).  In view of these time pressures, efforts to engage local 
communities have often been rushed and ineffective (Jones and Little, 2000; Osborne et al., 
2004; Morris, 2012; Lawless, 2011).  Regeneration initiatives have also tended to be highly 
prescriptive. For example, in the context of rural Britain, Edwards et al. (2000) suggests that 
a government agency often ‘sets the rules of the game, and is able to determine the types of 
partners enrolled, the lifespan of the partnership, its working practices and evaluation 
procedures, and its functional scope and territorial scale’ (p45).  Following the cessation of 
short-term funding, after the merits of the externally prescribed process have presumably 
been appreciated, it is left to local mainstream servicing agencies and the affected 
communities to continue the processes of regeneration.  Although policy has, to some degree, 
responded to these criticisms, even in the case of the urban-focused UK New Deal for 
Communities (NDC) scheme, for example, which actively attempted to engage communities 
over an unusually long ten-year period of external support, ‘partnerships operated in a 
political world where priorities and ministers changed and where pressures to “deliver” 
became ever more explicit’ (Lawless, 2011, p530).   
 
This short review has illustrated how government-initiated programmes have often failed to 
match the process to the challenge.  This paper explores the ‘art of the possible’ in terms of 
understanding the extent to which the political realities of government support can be better 
matched to the practical realities of local regeneration (Cloke and Little, 1990, p101).  These 
issues are explored within this paper through a small town, post-industrial regeneration case 
study which actively set out to better match the process to the challenge.  The Upper Calder 
Valley (UCV) Renaissance project in West Yorkshire (Northern England) was developed 
within a similar political context to the NDC, in the early 2000s, and also set out to address 
the transitory nature of government support.  Running for approximately ten years, the 
programme attempted to develop a long-term regeneration process for a cluster of small 
towns, where regeneration within the area had previously been slow and ineffective.  A key 
element of the externally prescribed process was cross-town collaboration around a locally 
developed, valley-wide strategy. It was hoped this prescription would challenge previous 
negative local practices (i.e. local competition, rather than the more desirable collaboration) 
and remoteness from their local authority.   
 
Whilst central control continues to occur within more recent regeneration efforts (Bentley and 
Pugalis 2013), in the context of austerity in the UK, externally prescribed processes of 
change, such as the UCV renaissance, are less likely to occur (Deas and Doyle, 2013; 
Broughton et al., 2013).  Whilst there are good reasons to be concerned about the lack of 
government regeneration funding, it is important to reflect on the efficacy of the government-
initiated programme model of regeneration.  Is the failure to match the process to the 
challenge due to poor design/implementation or is the approach fundamentally flawed? 
Through an in-depth study of regeneration that has been in place for over a decade, this paper 
questions whether government-prescribed processes of change, even in a more favourable 
funding context, provide the most appropriate model for regeneration.  Do we need to be 
more realistic about the political realities involved in government support? Do we need to 
look for alternative models of support which might better match the process to the challenge?  
Viewing the UCV experiment through the more contemporary lens of austerity, with the 
implied greater pressure to prioritise the use of funding, this paper provides important 
insights that are helpful for the future design of government-enabling support. 
 
Government-enabling support within local regeneration processes  
Given the mismatch between the transitory nature of government support and the long-term 
challenges of local regeneration, one option open to local communities within small towns is 
to go it alone.  However, this often represents a single issue/crisis response which may be 
short-lived, lack adequate funding and the necessary delivery mechanisms if not at least 
supported by external finance (Jeffreys and Munn, 1996; Osborne et al., 2004; O’Toole and 
Burdess, 2004; Bishop, 2010).  Due to their size and dispersed nature, rural governance 
bodies at the very local level often struggle to address the scope and scale of the wider spatial 
challenges/impacts arising.  Given the regeneration challenges faced by small towns, there 
may also be a need to better appreciate the ‘different ways of doing, seeing and knowing’ 
(Healey, 1997, p60).  Yet, guided by ‘political satisfaction’ (Rose, 2005, p2), local 
partnerships ‘often face real political and organisational difficulties in moving from low-risk, 
traditional projects to more creative, risky, challenging ventures’ (Boyle, 1993, p322).  In the 
absence of external authorities providing funding and taking some of the political risks, 
perhaps ‘local officials [will] have their horizons confined by the boundaries of their county’ 
(Rose, 2005, p3).  There may also be blockages/complexities within regeneration processes, 
perhaps including governance challenges (lack of consensus, contestation) and physical 
challenges (land assembly, infrastructure provision, remediation of contaminated land and 
removal of outdated structures) (Healey, 1997).  Faced with a lack of market activity, some 
means is required to close the gap between potential financial returns and the costs/risks 
associated with private investment, which would enable the value of local assets/creative 
ideas to be realised.  Given that external support can be crucial within local regeneration 
processes, the question remains as to how best to collaborate with external support agencies 
and how government support can be most effective.  
 
Drawing from the collaborative literature, external agencies are likely to play a blend of 
facilitative (embracing, empowering, involving and mobilising those involved) and directive 
roles (manipulating the collaborative agenda, “playing the politics”) (Vangen and Huxham, 
2003a).  Much criticism within the academic literature relates to the overly directive roles of 
government agencies, where their involvement has often gone well beyond the ‘healthy 
balance’ between developing a ‘spirit of collaboration’ and the ‘pragmatism’ of gently 
pushing the process along, as described by Vangen and Huxham (2003a, pS61).  The 
overemphasis on the directive roles by government agencies might be due to the need to get 
things done within desired timescales (driven by national policy/political agendas) and a lack 
of trust in local level actors to deliver (leading to performance management). External 
organisations might be reluctant to ‘use their resources to support untried, and potentially 
troublesome, initiatives’ which have been developed locally (Lawless, 2011, p530).  Vangen 
and Huxham (2003a) report how effective directive approaches need to reflect an 
understanding of the nuances of local politics and how to play them.  This is a far cry from 
the nationally prescribed initiatives described in the introduction, which leave little 
space/time for facilitative activities and local specificity within delivery.   
 
Collaboration to enhance local agency 
The desire for self-help within local communities is not new (O’Toole and Burdess, 2004).  
However, in the context of austerity, the need for local actors to be active within regeneration 
has increased and, although perhaps secondary to growth priorities, the importance of self-
help and self-determination have also been recognised within UK political discourses on 
localism
1
 (Bailey and Pill, 2011; Deas, 2013).  Working within the confines of austerity, 
much will be asked of small town actors.  Indeed, local authorities will be increasingly 
focused on their statutory roles rather than regeneration activities.  National funding has also 
become increasingly difficult to access through a ‘discretionary allocation of resources to 
bidding partnerships on a competitive basis’ (Deas, 2013, p78).  Access to such resources 
will require enhanced local capacities.  However, guided by the need to gain funding, local 
actors could be ‘transformed into fund-raisers and lose sight of the more strategic issues 
involved’ (O’Toole and Burdess, 2004, p442).  Instead, local collaboration around a shared 
strategy may be important in helping to provide a ‘greater sense of purpose and direction’ and 
for local actors to ‘know what grants to go for, rather than being driven by random funding 
opportunities’ (Daniels et al., 2007, pxxii; Luther and Flora, 2000, p8).  In the context of 
austerity and with less funding available, local contestation between individual towns may 
increase (Broughton et al., 2013), but such competition within an area can be wasteful, with 
‘each [town] seeking to attract the interest of developers, investors and occupiers’ rather than 
                                                 
1
 It should be noted that localism is a contested concept and a move toward some form of localism is a common 
claim of many governments (Haughton et al, 2013; Bentley and Pugalis, 2013).  
working together to address common challenges (Healey, 1995, p225; Markey et al., 2012; 
Bentley and Pugalis, 2013).   
 
Faced with the complex/multi-dimensional nature of regeneration and a lack of relevant skills 
and finance, the ability of local agents to address such challenges may be enhanced through 
achieving a “collaborative advantage” (Vangen and Huxham, 2003a).  Such an advantage 
realised across a rural area could come from, for example, shared learning/knowledge, 
pooling of resources and rural communities speaking with a “collective voice” to influence 
servicing authorities.  Such collaboration ‘can bring a force of weight to policy debates and 
the market place’ that might not otherwise be achieved (Caffyn, 2004; Markey et al., 2012, 
p247; Healey, 2013).  As well as wasteful competition, a failure to adequately collaborate 
could also lead to the expensive and ineffective duplication of activities, neglect from funding 
opportunities and a failure to adequately address the scope and scale of the issues faced 
(Healey, 1995; Caffyn, 2004; Markey et al., 2012).  Although collaborative processes do not 
represent the only way forward, it is argued that those towns most amenable to such 
processes are better able to demonstrate purpose/direction and are more likely to gain voice 
within servicing/funding agencies and access to external funding. 
 
In terms of wider collaboration, small town actors are faced with a range of servicing bodies 
and departments, each with their own timescales and ‘foci of attention’, whereas these 
organisations are challenged to coordinate their activities across many small and dispersed 
rural settlements (Healey, 2007, p4; Owen et al., 2007).  Not helped by the complexity of 
these “many to many” relationships, cooperation between servicing/local authorities and rural 
partnerships is often poor (Jeffreys and Munn, 1996; Cheshire, 2006; Owen et al., 2007).  
Indeed, large local authority units can generate feelings of remoteness, where the delivery of 
services may be more focused on the needs of the largest town/urban area, and/or issues of 
‘cost-effective service delivery’, than on the nuances of local preferences and concerns 
(O’Toole and Burdess, 2004, p435; Newman et al., 2004; Markey et al., 2012; Bailey, 2012).  
Overcoming such “many to many” relationships may require a challenging transformation in 
the relationship, such that there is a shared understanding of the efforts of each party and a 
realistic appreciation of the potential roles which they can play (Hastings, 1996). The merits 
of rural communities addressing this challenge by developing a “collective voice” have 
already been stated.  A complementary/alternative strategy is for local communities to 
become providers themselves through community asset transfer (Bailey, 2012; Healey, 
2013).  Such a local role would still require collaboration with the serving authorities, but 
would give town/cross-town governance more influence within delivery.  However, not all 
communities have the necessary skills and/or are willing to take the risks involved in such 
enterprises, where, to be successful, local knowledge and management must lead to a more 
effective use of funding/assets than is achievable through local authority delivery.     
 
Although collaboration has considerable potential to increase the efficacy of local efforts 
(which may or may not be recognised locally), it rarely occurs spontaneously and may be 
constrained by longstanding rivalries, as well as concerns about loss of community identity 
and control (Countryside Agency, 2004; Osborne et al., 2004; Daniels et al., 2007; Bishop, 
2010).   Markey et al. (2012) suggests that there will often need to be a ‘profound political 
culture change among local elected leaders and the local electorate alike’ for collaboration to 
occur (p176); particularly where there is no ‘ingrained history of cooperation between 
neighbouring communities’ (p214).  This mismatch between external ideas/concepts of 
collaboration and the practical realities of local implementation is likely to lead to tensions 
between government agencies wishing to prescribe collaboration processes and the 
willingness of local agents to cooperate.  Encouraging external ideas/concepts to be adopted 
locally will require a balance between facilitative and directive roles.  
 
Balancing facilitative and directive roles  
How prescriptive should external agencies be in attempting to better balance facilitative and 
directive roles?  As noted above, external involvement has often been quite prescriptive.  
Viewed through the lens of the emerging post-political literature, external direction in terms 
of prescribed processes of regeneration may represent an attempt to circumvent, rather than 
tackle, the underlying political challenges to collaboration (Haughton et al, 2013).  For 
example, a key element of external prescription has often related to the definition of spaces of 
regeneration which can be seen as providing “soft” informal, or semi-formal, forms of 
governance that exist beyond, or in parallel with, the “hard” statutory entities, such as local 
authorities (Allmendinger and Haughton, 2009).  Lacking sensitivity to local circumstances, 
collaborative spaces of regeneration “inserted” by external agencies may prove to be a 
‘fabrication of [perceived] homogeneous place-bounded communities’ which pay little 
consideration to pre-existing political culture, tensions and/or local interactions (Shirlow and 
Murtagh, 2004, p59; Markey et al, 2012).  Rather than governance engineering, O’Toole and 
Burdess (2004) suggest that governance structures should vary ‘according to ways that local 
groups interact with their own community, as well as other levels of governance’, where 
‘social, demographic, historical, economic and biographical factors all impinge upon the way 
that groups develop their internal and external relationships’ (p435).  Indeed, there is a 
growing realisation that there is a need for local actors to choose their own “soft spaces” 
within which to work (Pollermann et al. 2013; Haughton et al, 2013).  However, drawing 
from recent localism debates in the UK, self-selected boundaries are potentially exclusionary, 
where local partnerships ‘essentially define their own constituency and determine who should 
be included in the political community that is to be engaged’ (Davoudi and Cowie, 2013, 
p563).  This would suggest some form of external arbitration on is still required. 
 
Faced with a top-down, prescribed approach to regeneration, one local reaction might be 
refusal to get involved. As Herbert-Cheshire and Higgins (2004) suggest, this may lead to 
exclusion from other forms of support, as ‘those [towns] that pursue the “wrong” 
development strategies [differing to those externally prescribed], or that respond through … 
protest, are consequently deemed as non-responsible communities undeserving of outside 
support’ (p300).  Yet, rather than the dualisms of ‘faithful acceptance of policy, or its refusal 
through overt strategies of resistance’, rural actors at the town level have other alternative 
strategies available to them (Herbert-Cheshire, 2003, p468).   Recognising the importance of 
external funding, town actors may consciously decide to ‘“play along” with the demands of 
state agencies’ (Cheshire, 2006, p144).  Such a temporary “buy-in” may be possible if it is 
seen to be beneficial to local communities.  At other times, they may not be prepared to be 
‘quite so compliant’ and ‘seek to effect change by pressuring local experts to represent their 
interests’ (Cheshire, 2006, p145).  Given the context specificity required within the 
development of local governance processes, it is argued that generic top-down prescription is 
unlikely to lead to a process suitable for the delivery of long-term regeneration.  Achieving 
genuine local “buy-in” and collaboration is best developed though “small wins” (modest/low 
risk schemes) (Ansell and Gash, 2008), where Vangen and Huxham (2003b) see the building 
of trust between collaborative partners to be potentially a virtuous circle, as gradually larger 
challenges can be addressed.  However, such subtle and slow processes of development are 
unlikely to be consistent with the political realities of transitory support for rapid delivery.   
 
One form of local collaboration which better matches this ideal is community enterprise. 
Responsible for a specific area (“soft space”), and sometimes a legacy from previous national 
regeneration initiatives, Bailey (2012) sees community enterprises as ‘a new model of 
neighbourhood regeneration … which accentuates the people and their assets … mobilising 
residents to manage their assets and to manage them in collaboration with statutory and non-
statutory bodies’ (p32).  In a similar way to the ideal described by Vangen and Huxham 
(2003b), such enterprises have developed incrementally through “small wins”, building trust 
within their local communities and with external funding bodies through their substantive 
outcomes.  Reflecting better the practical realities of developing local capacity to manage 
long-term change, Bailey (2012) describes how it has taken decades for these enterprises to 
become established and financially stable.  Given their long-term nature, community 
enterprises can develop a different relationship with external funding bodies, gaining a 
reputation for successful delivery, providing an alternative approach to new partnership 
formation and perhaps also influencing political priorities (Bailey and Pill, 2011; Healey, 
2013).  This illustrates that, whilst tensions between the long-term/slow regeneration realities 
of local implementation and the need for short-term results are perhaps ubiquitous within 
government initiatives, there may be alternative ways of channelling funding which better 
match the process to the challenge.   
 
Case study background and methodology 
Whilst there may be potential for the development of alternative models of regeneration, this 
paper focuses on government-initiated programmes.  Although many favourable outcomes 
have resulted from externally prescribed regeneration initiatives, the literature review has 
illustrated how they have often failed to match the process to the challenge.  Within the 
confines of government-initiated programmes, can the political realities of government 
support be better matched to the practical realities of local regeneration?  This paper explores 
the “art of the possible” through a post-industrial, small town case study within the Upper 
Calder Valley (UCV) (West Yorkshire, Northern England), within which a regional 
government initiative attempted to better match the process to the challenge.  The relevance 
of this case study can best be explained by developing an understanding of the context within 
which the regeneration initiative was developed.  
 
The last decade in England perhaps represented a unique period, where small towns briefly 
became central to national, and then regional, policy drives for rural growth and regeneration, 
as a result of their prominence within the Rural White Paper published in 2000 (DETR and 
MAFF, 2000). The project in the UCV was part of the region-wide (Yorkshire and Humber) 
Renaissance Market Town (RMT) programme, which was developed in the context of the 
emerging England-wide Market Town Initiative (MTI).  The MTI ran between 2002 and 
2005, but was initially piloted within the Yorkshire and Humber region, through six towns 
(starting in 2001 and including the case study town of Todmorden). This was then extended 
to a further six towns within the region (12 towns in total) as part of the mainstream national 
programme (starting in 2002). Parallel to the England-wide MTI, the then new “Single Pot” 
funding, which pooled resources from a number of contributing government departments, 
allowed Yorkshire Forward (YF), and other Regional Development Agencies, to allocate 
funding within their region based on their perceived need for economic development.  In 
many cases, small towns received a proportion of this funding (Morris, 2011).  Early in the 
Yorkshire and Humber MTI programme, YF recognised that the MTI programme was not 
sufficiently strategy-orientated or community-led. Based partly on the perceived initial 
success of YF’s Renaissance Towns and Cities programme (implemented in 2001 for the 
regeneration of larger urban areas), the RMT programme was launched in 2002 as an attempt 
to better match the process to the challenge.  YF’s involvement in the RMT programme 
ended in 2012, as it was disbanded by the UK coalition government.   
 
Whilst the MTI was typically short-lived and process-driven, where, for example, community 
efforts were often developed simultaneously, rather than prior to the development and 
implementation of projects (Caffyn, 2004; Countryside Agency, 2004; Powe and Hart, 2008; 
Morris, 2011; Morris, 2012), the UCV Renaissance proved to be a more sustained, 
incremental and strategy-orientated process of change.  Indeed, the resultant UCV 
Renaissance programme differs markedly from many other regeneration initiatives in terms 
of the length of external support, allowing sufficient time for community input to strategy 
formation and encouraging implementation to be strategy-led.  As part of YF’s attempts to 
better match the process to the challenge, the UCV Renaissance Programme was also 
prescriptive.  The Programme was developed in the context of slow and ineffective local 
regeneration, where there were feelings within the UCV of remoteness from their 
metropolitan local authority (Calderdale Council) and an atmosphere of competition for 
funding, rather than collaboration across the valley (Yorkshire and Humber Assembly, 
2004
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).   Directed and facilitated by YF, the Programme prescribed a cross-valley/cross-town 
collaborative process which sought to challenge what were perceived to be negative local 
practices and to realise a vision of better coordination and linkages across the valley and with 
the local authority, Calderdale Council (CC).  As noted within the literature review, there is 
much academic support for the need for such local collaboration.  
 
Focusing on the extent to which government support can be better matched to the 
regeneration challenge, the case study provides an excellent opportunity to explore the “art of 
the possible” within a more sustained and financially favourable context.  A key challenge 
faced when undertaking in-depth research is gaining an understanding of what sort of case 
study is being investigated. At one extreme, this case study could be regarded as a ‘crucial’ or 
‘critical’ case, in which a failure to deliver would seriously question the validity of the 
externally prescribed approach to regeneration (Gerring, 2007; Flyvbjerg, 2011).  In reality, 
such crucial cases rarely exist, where debates are likely to focus on the extent to which the 
unfavourable outcomes identified relate to poor design, challenging contexts or the 
fundamental inadequacies of the model.  The UCV proved to be a challenging context, 
particularly in terms of encouraging collaboration. Within the contemporary context of 
austerity, the question here is different.  Given the need for prioritisation of external support 
to circumstances within which it will be most effective, what lessons can be learnt in terms of 
how to better focus the minimal external support which will be available?  Does the 
externally prescribed model still have relevance within this context?  The lessons emerging 
from the case study analysis will be interpreted through this lens, where, consistent with an 
‘information-orientated approach’ to case study selection, researching the UCV programme 
provides important insights that will be helpful in the future design of external enabling 
support (Flyvbjerg, 2011, p307).  
 
The region-wide RMT programme consisted of 25 towns/larger rural settlements (five within 
the case study area), many of which faced problems of ‘decline or peripherality’ (YF, 2011, 
p5).  The term “renaissance” was seen to reflect the desired ‘rediscovery, rebirth and 
improvement’ in the prospects of these settlements (YF, 2011, p5).  The UCV was the first 
and, by virtue of which, the longest running programme – a key focus of this paper.  It is also 
particularly interesting in terms of the collaborative vision.  Local authorities across the 
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 This slow process and negative atmosphere was corroborated within the research interviews.  
region often wished to have a ‘single community body with which [they] can deal’ 
(Yorkshire Forward, 2008, page 21), with six town clusters being formed (accounting for 15 
settlements in the programme).  The rationale for the clustered approach was strongest where 
towns faced similar challenges, often resulting from industrial decline and/or shared 
transport/recreational links, which were all present within the UCV partnership.   Indeed, due 
to a lack of natural synergies between towns, and local opposition, interviewee comments 
suggested collaboration was not attempted with the same vigour elsewhere in the region. 
 
The case study began with an initial documentary analysis and orientation exercise.  In order 
to supplement this background understanding and help scope the issues to be considered 
within the case study, six themed in-depth interviews were undertaken with the former 
programme manager of the RMT initiative (2003-2010).  This was followed by the case study 
analysis of the UCV, which focused on issues relating to the strategic approach, governance 
structures and the need to deliver a long-term regeneration process.  Building on the findings 
of previous interviews undertaken in 2005 (interviews with four key actors), the case study 
was further explored in 2011/12 through a combination of semi-structured interviews (further 
interviews with nine key actors), partnership meeting attendance and documentary analysis 
(minutes of all partnership meetings available during the period of support, press releases, 
town-level internet discussion forums, newspaper commentary, policy documents etc.).  Four 
further in-depth interviews were then held with the former programme manager, who was 
asked to reflect on the findings and discuss how typical the issues arising within the case 
study were within other RMT locations.  Further research was also undertaken early in 2014 
(mostly through further document analysis) which enabled a better understanding of what 
happened after the cessation of mainstream funding.   
 
Within the interviews, a range of people were consulted (members of the local partnerships, 
CC, YF representatives, local councillors and an expert advisor), including a number of 
critical voices.  The topics covered within the interviews related to reflections on the process 
of strategy formation, the appropriateness of the governance structures developed, challenges 
faced within implementation and the likely future prospects beyond mainstream funding.  
Given the sensitivities involved in this ongoing project, we are unable to give further details. 
All quotes from these interviews are anonymous.  In total, over 40 hours of interviews were 
undertaken and a huge amount of UCV documentary evidence researched (in excess of 300 
sources).   
 
Case study area 
The UCV case study area incorporates approximately a 20km length of the valley, with the 
largest settlements being Sowerby Bridge
3
, Mytholmroyd (approximate population of 3,730), 
Hebden Bridge (4,086), Todmorden and Walsden (combined population of 11,555).  As 
illustrated in Figure 1, these towns are naturally linked by the stark physical geography of the 
valley and by the road, rail, canal and river networks which run along the valley bottom.  The 
growth of the towns was largely due to the development of the textile industry, but this went 
into decline in the second half of the twentieth century, leaving a legacy of blight, socio-
economic challenges and, particularly in the case of Todmorden, population decline 
(Jennings, 1992).  Despite these negative factors, the area’s rural character (including 
impressive views within the valley) and proximity to urban centres has led to it becoming a 
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 The population figures come from the Population Census 2001 (Office for National Statistics, 2004). Sowerby 
Bridge was not identified as separate from Halifax within the population census and is thought to be slightly 
larger than Todmorden.  
popular residential location.  Constrained by the stark physical geography of the area and 
planning restrictions on change of use of employment land, better quality housing has been in 
short supply throughout the valley and house prices have risen significantly as a result (CC, 
2011).  
 
The towns are varied in character, with Todmorden and Sowerby Bridge being the most 
deprived (CC, 2011).  Whilst Mytholmroyd is important in terms of employment (particularly 
manufacturing), it provides only limited retail services.  Nearby Hebden Bridge is more 
focused on tourism and creative industries and has an unusually strong independent retail 
sector (New Economics Foundation 2005; CC, 2011).  Its engagement with regeneration 
started much earlier than the other towns and it has laid claim to being an early adopter of 
heritage use within regeneration and has perhaps been most affected by gentrification 
(Fletcher, 1990; Smith, 1998).  Todmorden is an employment (particularly manufacturing) 
and services centre (but with a high vacancy rate within its retail units) (CC, 2011). 
Todmorden was an early participant in the MTI pilot, which initiated efforts towards 
regenerating its town centre.  Although part of the natural valley, Sowerby Bridge (located on 
the edge of the large urban area of Halifax) is less rural in character (including high-rise flats) 
and is an important service and employment centre (CC, 2011).   
 
Balancing directive and facilitative roles  
The UCV renaissance process began with the most directive, and perhaps controversial, act 
of the programme.  The whole UCV (as defined by YF in consultation with CC) was chosen 
for the purpose of this regeneration.  For most of the interviewees, this selection process was 
one of mystery and speculation.  Two interviewees were more insightful in terms of the 
timing, confirming the minimal community involvement and explaining the motivations for 
including the more urban Sowerby Bridge (it was suggested that CC had been influential 
here, as the town had not been included within the Halifax Renaissance Towns and Cities 
programme).  The upper valley-wide prescription speeded up programme design and 
reflected political objectives, but, the lack of ownership by the communities over its creation, 
or awareness of local history/culture within its definition, added to the challenges of 
delivering a long-term collaborative process.  As such, the regeneration process was driven 
initially more by short-term expediency than the long-term practical realities of ensuring 
flexibility or sensitivity to local preferences.   
 
In terms of the communities themselves, the process began with the development of a 
vision/strategy document for the UCV.  Drawing from the Regional/Urban Design Assistance 
Teams (R/UDAT) (Peiser and Nelson, 1997), which sits within the American Institute of 
Architects (AIA), a yearlong strategy development process combined the input of local 
communities with a multi-disciplinary team of recognised external “experts” (specialists in 
design, highways, rural economy, agriculture and tourism).  Consistent with the UCV-wide 
prescription, the lead consultants on the strategy document were instructed to “look for issues 
which can draw people together within the valley, but without threatening the individual 
identity of the settlements” (anonymous interviewee).  A crucial part of this approach was the 
use of valley-wide community action groups on a range of important topics.  The need to 
encourage valley-wide collaboration ran through the strategy document and included 
ideas/concepts for encouraging this process.  These included: joint marketing strategies; 
development of the ‘valley voice’; and providing a network of ‘21st Century Marketplaces’ 
across the valley (p18).  Comments on the process by interviewees suggested it was a “useful 
exercise”, “very informative” and “enjoyable”.  
 
Despite the importance of the valley-wide approach within the “strategy document”, only the 
larger “rural” settlements within the UCV were to receive direct support and funding.  This 
approach reflected the national government’s focus on towns within rural regeneration; with 
YF following an ethos (confirmed by interviewees) of avoiding ‘spreading resources too 
thinly’ (YF, 2011, p2).   Due to complications with the main scheme for Walsden, no projects 
were developed in the town.  As such, only Todmorden, Hebden Bridge, Mytholmroyd and 
Sowerby Bridge received support in the form of project funding from YF through the UCV 
renaissance.  
 
In order to aid delivery of the “prescribed” cross-town approach, a community partnership 
Upper Calder Valley Renaissance (UCVR) was formed as a not-for-profit company.  
Community-based Town Teams were also developed, based on recent partnerships formed 
just prior to the UCV programme.  Importantly, the partnerships across the UCV are non-
hierarchical, where collaboration is voluntary and based on the mutual benefits that result.  
This non-hierarchical structure defined the character and roles of the partnerships, and also 
eased frictions that might otherwise have occurred.  There was also a degree of empowerment 
at the local level.  Whilst CC often played an important leading role within project delivery, 
the Town Teams were involved within all the projects and their support was required if 
financial assistance from YF was to be provided.   
 
Unlike the MTI, which employed a town-level coordinator, the RMT programme ‘relied on 
developing the capacity of the community’ (those involved within the town partnerships) 
(YF, 2011, p1).  As the ‘dissipation of skills and experience vested in the project officers’ 
was one of the ‘major losses associated with the wind-up of the whole MTI programme’ 
(Countryside Agency, 2004, p60; Owen et al., 2007), it was hoped this more community-
orientated approach would provide a longer-term legacy.  Community involvement and 
capacity was assisted through various support mechanisms, including a region-wide 
Partnership Skills Programme which provided a menu of voluntary training and support to 
develop skills, capacity and confidence.  As such, an attempt was made to facilitate, as well 
as direct, although these efforts to enhance local capacity received mixed responses.  There 
were many positive elements of this programme, but critical comments (“patronising”; 
“insulting”) were directed at the structured training which was prescribed at the “elite” 
management level within YF, despite evidence presented by staff most closely involved 
which suggested that formal approaches were ‘not how communities learn’.  As such, the 
process could have better matched local challenges.  Given that opportunities for external 
funding come and go, one of the aims of the Programme was to enable actors within the case-
study towns to be in a better position to respond to new opportunities, as they emerge, and to 
assess whether such opportunities are appropriate to local goals.  This objective would appear 
to have been achieved, as it was evident from the interviewees that the local capacity to 
manage local processes of regeneration had been significantly enhanced over the period of 
the Programme.   
 
The key elements within the “strategic document” related, in particular, to removing blight 
and giving town centres a competitive and contemporary relevance, where there was seen to 
be potential to build on the towns’ assets in terms of their ‘unique cultural and physical 
heritage’ (JTP, 2003, pI).  Although projects needed to be at least “loosely” linked to 
economic development to gain YF funding, this was not generally a problem in the UCV as 
the lack of vital and viable town centres was one of the major challenges faced.  The projects 
were largely public sector funded, with most being jointly financed between CC and YF.  
This approach to funding seemed more facilitative than directive.  Where projects did not fit 
the required profile for YF, help was provided to identify other funding.  Indeed, a key 
supportive role of YF officers was to encourage information exchange. Help was therefore 
provided in understanding forthcoming external funding opportunities and how to apply for 
them.   
 
Realising the collaborative vision 
One of the most directive elements of the UCV programme was the “prescription” of the 
cross-valley collaborative vision.  Faced with an uncoordinated multitude of rural 
partnerships, a key challenge to governance within the UCV case study area was to nurture 
and operationalise cross-valley collaboration.  Interviewees reported a “competitive” rather 
than a “collaborative” environment prior to the UCV Renaissance Programme.  Such 
competition was particularly evident between Hebden Bridge and Todmorden, where two 
interviewees used the similar phrase “these towns may be only five miles apart but are very 
different”.   Between-town rivalry was seen by interviewees to have a long tradition within 
the UCV.  Jennings (1992) reports ‘stark contrasts’ in terms of former textile production.  
Todmorden produced cotton products, whereas woollen-based textiles were more common 
throughout the rest of the UCV (p162).  For production reasons and its proximity to the 
county boundary, Todmorden was traditionally seen to have had closer links with the nearby 
County of Lancashire.   Despite the natural physical linkages and the close proximity of the 
towns, this history/culture suggests that developing a long-term valley-wide collaborative 
vision would be a challenge.  This section considers the extent to which the “prescribed” 
vision of cross-valley collaboration was realised.  
 
Consistent with the work of Cheshire (2006), reaction to external prescription was varied.  
Some people were convinced of the merits of cross-valley collaboration: “There should be a 
feeling of united we stand and we’re all the UCVR, it is a vision … can I make a little plea to 
buy into the vision to work with towns across the valley” (former community director of the 
UCVR, Todmorden Pride Minutes 2009).  Others reported a “playing along” to gain external 
funding (“you don’t think we were working together because we wanted to”), and there was 
sometimes even a complete failure to appreciate the merits of cross-town collaboration.  
People may be passionate about their own neighbourhood/town but as one interviewee said 
there is the need to ‘capture this passion and not dilute it if you consider a valley-wide 
initiative’.  
 
Commitment to cross-town collaboration would appear to be strongest in Hebden Bridge and 
Mytholmroyd, with less interest from the two peripheral towns of Sowerby Bridge and 
Todmorden.  Key actors within the towns of Hebden Bridge and Mytholmroyd have been 
working together since 1937, when their urban district councils were merged (since 1974 this 
became the Hebden Royd Town Council) (HBCA, undated).  Interestingly, HBCA (undated) 
report how this initial coming together in 1937 was ‘reluctant’ (p10).  Although separate 
towns, they provide different roles in the UCV, and interviewees suggested there was little in 
the way of competition between them.  Whilst town partnerships continue within Hebden 
Bridge, Todmorden and Mytholmroyd, the Sowerby Bridge town team had disbanded by the 
time of interviewing in 2012.   
 
Studying the minutes of the Todmorden Town Team meetings and comments from 
interviewees, it is clear that some members had struggled with the cross-town collaboration 
idea.  Indeed, some interviewees even felt the cross-town approach was a “focus for rivalry”.  
Based on comments from interviewees, it would appear to be a challenge gaining a consensus 
within Todmorden itself, where interviewee comments suggested that “there are a series of 
groups which just don’t communicate with each other” and “I’m pessimistic about these 
groups being able to work together”.  To tackle these problems, following the cessation of 
YF, CC set up a Todmorden Development Board which only included elected members of 
Todmorden Town Council and CC.  Justification for this movement towards a more directive 
representative democracy approach was to suggest that there have been ‘a number of groups 
with an interest in Todmorden town centre set up over the last ten or so years … [which] has 
led to a fragmented and disjointed approach, with no single, shared vision for the future of 
Todmorden and no overall governance process to drive this forward’ (CC, 2013, p1).  As 
demonstrated below, this more directive approach is being complemented with bottom-up 
community-orientated creativity.   
 
In terms of collaboration with the local authority, one of the motivations for the UCV RMT 
programme was a feeling of remoteness from CC prior to the Programme.  Remoteness from 
CC can be illustrated by some examples. The combination of the heritage, canal and 
landscape within the UCV suggested there was significant potential for tourism.  Yet, there 
was no longer an associated Tourism Development Officer within CC (JTP, 2003).  In 
Hebden Bridge, a controversial sale of Council buildings had also contributed to the strong 
feelings of remoteness from decision making, as the council attempted to restructure service 
delivery.  Further similar concerns had been raised in the case of their town hall which was 
seen to have high architectural/heritage value, but, due to under-utilisation by CC, was in a 
poor state of repair. Other comments by interviewees related, in particular, to a previous lack 
of engagement with town-level actors.   
 
The relationship between the local communities and the local council had certainly been 
strengthened since the conception of the UCV programme, where, to some degree, a mutual-
transformation would appear to have occurred (Hastings, 1996).  The most visible expression 
of this transformation was the recognition of town and valley partnerships within the local 
plans (unitary development plan adopted in 2006, and draft core strategy 2011).  Integration 
of activities was also achieved within tourism.  Following the collaborative work by the 
community valley-wide tourism group, the awareness and the role of the local authority in 
supporting this had been strengthened, with CC committing staff time and marketing efforts 
to its enhancement.  Influence was also achieved in terms of economic development and 
transport linkages, where the “valley voice” expressed through the UCVR partnership proved 
to be important in getting the local authority and other servicing bodies to listen.   
 
Despite this success, the UCVR was dissolved following the cessation of YF funding during 
2012.   However, to merely dismiss these efforts as a short-term solution to the challenges of 
developing long-term collaboration would be too simplistic.  Whilst criticising the “big fix” 
prescriptive nature of the initial designation, at the time of writing (in early 2014) there have 
been some positive long-term outcomes of the process.  In terms of cross-valley groups, 
transport and tourism were seen to be the most relevant; and a highly motivated group of 
individuals remained committed to these cross-valley issues.  Whilst the “strategy document” 
emphasised the valley-wide vision, it was not until 2010 that a valley-wide project began to 
emerge.  The canal which runs through all the towns is now seen as a “linear park”, where 
efforts are being focused on improving accessibility, signposting and interpretation.  This is a 
non-controversial scheme which was developed within the local communities.  Another post 
YF development has been the Upper Calder Valley Plain Speaker which is a professionally–
run, on-line news website which is funded externally by charitable trusts.  “Small wins” such 
as these could slowly improve cross-valley collaboration, and perhaps prove more effective 
than external prescription.   
 Matching the process to the challenge within the UCV 
As noted within the literature review, achieving political continuity within national/regional 
regeneration initiatives is challenging, as ten years of consistent external support is rare.  As 
with the NDC programme described in the introduction, political continuity was challenging 
over the 10 year period of the RMT - with change in terms of the emphasis, themes and 
political motivations still occurring.  For the UCV, however, the emphasis remained focused 
on the delivery of the small town elements of the valley-wide strategy.  By the final cessation 
of the YF funding in 2012, the outcomes of this period of activity had not transformed the 
towns, but had contributed to the ongoing process of regeneration.  Most of these projects 
relate to the town centres. Some blight has been removed and public realm improved 
(Todmorden, Hebden Bridge); car domination has been reduced (Hebden Bridge); heritage 
has been conserved and usage enhanced (Hebden Bridge; Mytholmroyd); and the relocation 
and improvement of a market has taken place (Sowerby Bridge).  In the case of Todmorden 
town centre, the efforts within the RMT programme formed just part of the long-running, on-
going and controversial regeneration.  In contrast, Mytholmroyd now has a new, attractive 
and popular congregation point.   
 
The findings illustrate that whilst a strategy, rather than a funding-led programme, may 
produce more appropriate outcomes, it can lead to frustrations as progress is often slow.  
Following publication of the valley-wide strategy in 2003, there was a long wait for delivery.  
Recognising the need for some projects to be delivered in the shorter term, a small grants 
programme was initially set up by YF, where modest funding was allocated by the UCVR for 
projects consistent with the strategy document. This further empowered the local 
partnerships.  Yet, many local actors would appear to have been frustrated by the delays and 
the perceived lack of action.  Indeed, a key finding from a feedback event in 2010, on the 
implementation of the RMT programme in the UCV, was the need for improved 
communication on the progress of key projects, where concerns were raised in terms of being 
kept informed of progress.  Interviewees suggested that the main factors influencing the 
timing of delivery related to new information coming to light (particularly in terms of 
flooding risk), challenges gaining the involvement and agreement of key players, timing (as 
funding opportunities varied during the programme) and simply running out of time (key 
staff were lost as YF began to wind down their role in 2010).  Negotiating with several 
agencies/developers/owners with their own foci of interest and timescales, balancing 
objectives, incorporating community input into design, gaining planning permission and 
receiving the support of the key actors affected and the wider community all takes time.  
Even with the generous length of the funding period, and a few inevitable mistakes along the 
way, most completed projects required between six and ten years.  Other projects still require 
more time.  These realities of local implementation are simply not consistent with the desire 
for short-term political satisfaction (Rose, 2005; Lawless et al., 2010).   
 
A further important finding within this in-depth study is the importance of community 
activities emerging at the local level.  In the context of globalisation and the lack of locational 
advantages of small towns (size and proximity to markets/large infrastructure networks etc.), 
creative/innovative solutions are required for these places to remain competitive.  The results 
suggest there is potential for such solutions to emerge at the local level through community 
activity.  Whilst an attempt by YF to transfer an asset to the UCVR was restricted by the 
rising price of the targeted property, other forms of community enterprise have emerged 
within the valley.  The threatened Hebden Bridge town hall provides one such favourable 
outcome.  Consistent with the aspirations expressed in the valley-wide strategy, the building 
was subject to a community asset transfer followed by renovation; and an exhibition 
area/enterprise centre was developed behind the site.  This community-run business centre 
was completed in 2012 and all the units were soon occupied.  Whilst receiving help from YF 
in gaining significant financial support from the European Regional Development Fund, this 
project only occurred because it was championed by key individuals within the town.  Based 
on the lessons learnt from this scheme, local partnerships are attempting to extend the 
community transfer approach to other local authority assets elsewhere within the valley.  One 
such application is from Incredible Edible Todmorden (IET).   
 
Started in 2008 by a group of activists, IET is a local food initiative, which involves urban 
gardening throughout the town, promoting food learning and local producers, distributors and 
retailers of local produce.  This initiative has generated much media coverage and attracted 
many people to visit Todmorden.  Developed simultaneously, but largely unrelated, to the 
RMT programme, IET is consistent with the valley-wide strategy and draws food produce 
from throughout the valley.  Whilst this is “Todmorden’s scheme”, the ethos has spread both 
nationally and internationally, but, most importantly within this context, through the linear 
park project and the development of Incredible Edible Mytholm it has also spread within the 
UCV.  Through the sale of local food to residents and visitors, IET has supported local 
retailers within the challenged town centre (Havers, 2013).  Through the support of YF and 
CC, efforts to help regenerate Todmorden town centre have focused on the “politically 
unsatisfactory” processes of removing blight through necessary demolition (Rose, 2005).  
These blockages to regeneration were unlikely to be resolved by community activity.  Yet, in 
the context of a highly politically-charged town, community efforts through the IET have 
provided a non-controversial focus for the revival of vitality, local pride, public realm and 
commercial activity within the town centre.  These examples illustrate that ‘no single 
stakeholder has the resources or jurisdiction to tackle the multidimensional problems’ faced; 
and collaboration is required that involves community, local government and external 
agencies all playing their part (Markey et al., 2012, p226). 
 
Conclusion 
Drawing from a wide-ranging academic literature, a mismatch between the process and the 
regeneration challenge is commonly observed.  Government-initiated programmes tend to 
reflect the political realities of transitory and generic support for rapid delivery, whereas the 
practical realities of regeneration require a sustained, collaborative, spatially-sensitive 
process of change. Given the continued importance of government support within place-
based regeneration, this paper has explored the “art of the possible” in terms of better 
matching the process to the challenge. This has been explored through an unusually long-
running, valley-wide, post-industrial case study in Northern England which set out to address 
the transitory nature of external funding and to prescribe a process of local collaboration.  
There is much support in the academic literature for such local collaboration.  Although, in 
the context of austerity, such government-initiated processes are now less likely to occur, 
important lessons can be learnt from this experiment, the design of which was a reaction to 
the inadequacies of previous government initiatives.   
 
The role of Yorkshire Forward was found to be essential in providing initial momentum, 
facilitating engagement, bringing new ideas to the regeneration process, and removing 
blockages which would have been difficult to deal with locally.  Yet, consistent with other 
previous initiatives, frictions emerged as the regional development agency strived to balance 
facilitative and directive roles.  Rural areas do not provide ‘homogeneous place-bounded 
communities’ (Shirlow and Murtagh, 2004, p59) and “soft spaces” developed need to reflect 
the local context.  Drawing from the post-political literature, attempts to prescribe such “soft 
spaces” externally circumvent, rather than tackle, the underlying political challenges to 
collaboration (Haughton et al, 2013).  The upper valley-wide collaborative approach speeded 
up programme design and reflected the local political objectives of the council, but, as there 
was little local ownership in its definition by the communities themselves, or awareness of 
history and culture in the Upper Calder Valley, which may have affected the legacy of the 
programme.  Indeed, subject to external arbitration, there is a growing realisation within the 
literature that local actors need to choose their own “soft spaces” within which to work 
(Haughton et al, 2013; Pollermann et al. 2013).  Indeed, rather than been imposed from 
above, through small incremental “wins” there would appear to be a slow realisation of the 
merits of valley-wide collaboration, with ideas for its realisation being slowly developed at a 
local level.   
 
Once the governance structure had been externally prescribed, the ten year programme 
allowed time for strategy formation and the development/implementation of some strategic 
projects.  This strategy-led process, which relied heavily on the local council and 
communities, was viewed locally as too slow by many residents.  Interestingly, the 
immediacy of political life experienced nationally was found to also apply at the local level.  
Local communities want regeneration challenges to be dealt with quickly, even if this is not 
consistent with practical realities.  These political realities are a fundamental flaw of 
government involvement, whether local, regional or national.  In order to better match the 
process to practical realities of complex regeneration, ways of freeing the process from 
political pressure need to be sought.  Freed from the pressure of politics, the experiences of 
Bailey (2012) and Healey (2013) suggest that community enterprises may be given more time 
by local communities to build up trust through “small wins”.  A similar pattern would appear 
to be emerging within the Upper Calder Valley (UCV) and is likely to produce a revenue 
stream which can be used for the benefit of the local communities. This is clearly an area 
worthy of further research.  In the context of globalisation and the lack of competitive 
advantage within small towns, the findings suggest that local communities may provide an 
important source of creative/innovative ideas leading to the necessary local distinctiveness in 
offer.  Regeneration support must encourage such local initiative. 
 
Although it will be very difficult for the political continuity of the government support 
observed within the UCV to be repeated, for some key projects and emerging regeneration 
ideas ten years was simply still not long enough.  This moment of opportunity has now 
passed for the UCV, but the focus on capacity within the Programme will help local actors 
respond to future opportunities.  The UCV programme formed one of many government 
efforts in the last decade in England, which provided a unique period during which small 
towns briefly became central to national, and then regional, policy drives for rural growth and 
regeneration. The timing of the external assistance was determined through national political 
priorities and it was up to local governance to respond to this moment of opportunity.  This 
period of support and focus on small towns has been beneficial for many settlements; 
particularly those able to quickly develop capacity to realise this moment of opportunity.   
For other towns, the moment of opportunity has passed with little benefit.  National/regional 
policy has its own timescales and political drivers, but so do the communities within small 
towns.  This illustrates the importance of strategy development at a local level.  Opportunities 
for external funding come and go.  Small town actors need to be not only ready to respond, 
but also aware of, and able to demonstrate, whether the funding opportunities are appropriate 
to local goals (Luther and Flora, 2000, p8; O’Toole and Burdess, 2004; O’Daniels et al., 
2007).  Government agencies represent temporary partners within the long-term processes of 
change and it is important to recognise this within scheme design.  Viewed from this 
perspective, government support for communities to generate strategy, enhance local 
collaboration and set up community enterprises may be just as constructive as external 
finance for the delivery of individual projects.  Indeed, consistent with the findings in this 
paper, community capacity can be ‘highly dependent’ on the nature and form of past policy 
interventions (Deas and Doyle, 2013, p374).   
 
Through observing actual regeneration practice over the long-term, the case study findings 
have helped to develop a more nuanced understanding of the roles of external organisations 
within small town regeneration.  Viewing the UCV experiment through the more 
contemporary lens of austerity, with the implied greater pressure to prioritise the use of 
funding, externally prescribed processes of change, such as the UCV renaissance, are less 
likely to occur (Deas and Doyle, 2013; Broughton et al., 2013).  Whilst there are good 
reasons to be concerned about the lack of government regeneration funding, it is important to 
reflect on the fundamental challenges of such approaches identified within this paper.  There 
is a need to be more realistic about what can be achieved through government support and 
new models are required.  Long-term regeneration processes need to be locally led, where 
“big fix” external prescriptions will generally not work.  Instead, successful processes are 
developed through repeated “small wins” over long periods.  Whilst localism is important, 
there is also the need to separate regeneration processes from transitory political priorities at 
all levels.  Whilst the UCV Renaissance scheme had drawn lessons from regeneration 
schemes in the US, perhaps there was also a need to consider the charitable nature of such 
programmes. This might suggest an alternative approach for channelling government funding 
to help build community capacity, as these charitable organisations tend to be less transitory 
than government agencies, both in terms of their nature and their underlying principles.  For 
example, in England, government agencies have come and gone.  Yet, the national charity 
Action for Market Towns (now called Towns Alive with a wider remit relating to towns and 
cities) has received funding to help town partnerships during the last decade and, despite 
cessation of that funding, has continued to provide support to town partnerships throughout 
the current period of austerity.  Such organisations may provide a means of introducing more 
continuity into regeneration support.   
 
In the context of austerity, the need for local actors to be active within regeneration has 
increased, with the importance of self-help and self-determination being also recognised 
within UK national political discourses.  With local authorities increasingly focused on their 
statutory roles rather than regeneration activities, they are unlikely to provide much support 
for community capacity development or assessing external funding.  Whilst new models of 
regeneration such as community enterprises might hold potential for matching the process to 
the challenge, they can have significant start-up costs and require the sort of practical support 
which is unlikely to be available from local authorities.  Writing in 2014 there would seem to 
be inadequate support for such community development available, where the authors are 
aware of a common feeling within English small town communities that localism is more 
rhetoric than reality.  Whilst community rights have been enhanced (for example community 
right to bid for important local assets which come up for sale), only limited funding is 
available to help facilitate such localism.  Within the context of competitive bidding, local 
capacity in project development and the writing of funding applications will be at a premium, 
where in the current context projects have to demonstrate they are deliverable in very tight 
time periods.  The specialist skills for such project development are beyond most 
communities, unless through serendipity, voluntary help is available from professionally 
experienced local residents.  In the absence of external guidance and practical support in 
developing new governance processes, such as a community enterprise, international 
experience suggests that “going it alone” without external support (at least in terms of 
funding) often represents a single issue/crisis response which may be short-lived, lack 
adequate funding and the necessary delivery mechanisms.  Government-led initiatives can be 
equally as ineffective.  From a research perspective there is a need to understand and 
demonstrate new models of how the process can be better matched to the challenge in the 
hope that this will influence future regeneration support.   
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